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Limiting the Influence to Vulnerable Users in
Social Networks: A Ratio Perspective
Huiping Chen, Grigorios Loukides, Jiashi Fan and Hau Chan
Abstract Influence maximization is a key problem in social networks, seeking to
find users who will diffuse information to influence a large number of users. A draw-
back of the standard influence maximization is that it is unethical to influence users
many of whom would be harmed, due to their demographics, health conditions, or
socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., predominantly overweight people influenced to
buy junk food). Motivated by this drawback and by the fact that some of these vul-
nerable users will be influenced inadvertently, we introduce the problem of finding a
set of users (seeds) that limits the influence to vulnerable users while maximizing the
influence to the non-vulnerable users. We define a measure that captures the quality
of a set of seeds, as an additively smoothed ratio between the expected number of
influenced non-vulnerable users and the expected number of influenced vulnerable
users. Then, we develop greedy heuristics and an approximation algorithm called
ISS for our problem, which aim to find a set of seeds that maximizes the measure.
We evaluate our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets and demonstrate that
ISS substantially outperforms a heuristic competitor in terms of both effectiveness
and efficiency while being more effective and/or efficient than the greedy heuristics.
1 Introduction
There has been an increased interest from the public and private sectors and orga-
nizations in leveraging social networks to spread information of adopting certain
behavior (e.g., buying ipads or alcoholic beverages). A typical methodology of an
organization is to influence a selected few users (seeds), through free gifts, dis-
counts, and information sessions, to adopt the desirable behavior. The hope is that
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these seeds will influence other users in their social circles to adopt the same be-
havior, and the subsequent influenced users will influence others in their respective
social circles. As the information propagates throughout the social network, eventu-
ally some number of users will adopt the desirable behavior.
As a result, the organization’s goal is to solve the problem of selecting a set
of k seeds which maximize the largest expected number of adoptions of all the
users in the social network (spread). This problem is known as the influence maxi-
mization problem in social networks [10] and has been widely studied in the recent
decade [14]. A main drawback of influence maximization is that it is unethical to
influence users many of whom could be harmed due to their demographics, health
conditions, or socioeconomic profile [7]. The users who could be harmed are re-
ferred to as vulnerable and are identified based on domain knowledge (e.g., user
message content and sentiment analysis) [15, 21]. For example, when an organiza-
tion aims to promote alcoholic beverages, it should avoid influencing users many
of whom have drinking problems. Similarly, when it aims to promote junk food, it
should avoid influencing users many of whom are overweight. This is important for
performing socially responsible influence maximization [1], which benefits not only
the vulnerable users but also the companies, because most users are often willing
to pay more for products marketed in a socially responsible way [19]. Motivated by
the presence of vulnerable users, we initiate the study of influence maximization in
social networks with both vulnerable and non-vulnerable users. In particular, due to
the diversity of social networks and that some vulnerable users will be influenced
inadvertently, we consider the problem of limiting the influence to vulnerable users
while maximizing the influence to the non-vulnerable users in social networks.
Contribution. Our work makes the following specific contributions.
(1) Influence Measure. To deal with influence maximization in our setting, we
need a measure to quantify the quality of a set S of seeds (seed-set). The measure
should ideally consider both vulnerable and non-vulnerable users, limit influencing
users many of whom are vulnerable, and allow obtaining a seed-set with guaranteed
quality. We examine the following natural measures and show that they are inap-
propriate to be used for influence maximization in our setting: (a) the difference
σN (S)−σV (S) and (b) the ratio σN (S)σV (S) , where S is a seed-set and σN (S) and σV (S) is
the expected number of influenced non-vulnerable users and vulnerable users, re-
spectively. Then, we propose an additive smoothing ratio (ASR) measure σN (S)+cσV(S)+c ,
where c > 0 is a specified constant. We show that ASR satisfies all the aforemen-
tioned properties and examine the impact of c in our influence maximization setting.
Thus, our problem becomes finding a seed-set S of size at most k that maximizes
ASR. This is a challenging problem because ASR is not monotone and neither sub-
modular nor supermodular, which implies that it cannot be approximated through
algorithms for submodular or supermodular maximization [4, 18, 23].
(2) Baseline Heuristics for Finding an ASR-Maximizing Seed-set. Since ASR is
a ratio of submodular functions, we develop a natural greedy heuristic (GR) that
finds a seed-set of size at most k and large ASR iteratively. In each iteration, GR
selects as seed a non-vulnerable node which influences a large number of additional
non-vulnerable nodes for a small number of additional vulnerable nodes. We then
develop GRMB , a variation of GR that estimates the spread efficiently.
(3) Approximation Algorithm for Finding an ASR-Maximizing Seed-set. We de-
sign ISS, an efficient approximation algorithm for finding a seed-set to maximize
ASR. Since ASR is not submodular, ISS cannot maximize it directly. Instead, ISS con-
structs three candidate seed-sets (one with ASR, another with a submodular lower
bound function of ASR, and a third with a submodular upper bound function of
ASR) and selects the best candidate seed-set. This is performed iteratively, with
different bound functions that aim to increase the ASR of the final seed-set. Our
experiments show that ISS outperforms a heuristic that is based on the difference
σN (S)−σV (S) [20] as well as GR and GRMB , with respect to ASR and the spread of
non-vulnerable and/or vulnerable nodes, while it is efficient and also scalable with
respect to the seed-set size k.
2 Background
Submodular functions. Let U be a universe of elements and 2U be its power set.
A function f : 2U → R is monotone, if f(X) ≤ f(Y ) for all subsets X ⊆ Y ⊆ U ,
and non-monotone otherwise. A function f : 2U → R is submodular, if it satisfies
the diminishing returns property f(X ∪{u})−f(X) ≥ f(Y ∪{u})−f(Y ), for all
X ⊆ Y ⊆ U and any u ∈ U \ Y [12]. If the property holds with equality, then f is
modular. A function f : 2U → R is supermodular if and only if −f is submodular
[12]. A modular function f : 2U → R is both submodular and supermodular. For
brevity, we may write f(X|u) for the marginal gain f(X ∪ {u})− f(X).
Let f : 2U → R be a submodular function. For any Y ⊆ U , the modular upper
bound f̂Y (X) of f(X) is a modular function [9]
f̂Y (X) = f(Y )+
∑
u∈X\Y
(f({u})− f({}))−
∑
u∈Y \X
(f(Y )− f(Y \ {u})) (1)
and the modular lower bound
̂
fY,piY (X) of f(X) is a modular function [9]
̂
fY,piY (X) =
∑
u∈X
fY,piY (u). (2)
Y is referred to as the parameter of the bound, piY is a random permutation of the
elements of Y (i.e., one-to-one mapping of Y onto itself), and
fY,piY (u) =
{
f(piYu )− f(piYu−), if u ∈ Y
0, otherwise
(3)
where piYu− is the prefix of pi
Y comprised of all elements of piY that appear before u
in piY , and piYu is the prefix of pi
Y comprised of all elements of piYu− and u.
Independent Cascade (IC) model. To model influence, we consider the classical
IC model [10, 20, 24]. The model views the social network as a weighted directed
graph G(V,E), where V and E is the set of nodes and edges of G, respectively.
In our setting, V is partitioned into N and V , comprised of all non-vulnerable and
vulnerable nodes, respectively. We assume that N 6= ∅, otherwise no seed can be
selected, and that V is selected by the organization performing influence maximiza-
tion based on domain knowledge [15, 21]. The set of in-neighbors (respectively,
out-neighbors) of a node u is denoted with n−(u) (respectively, n+(u)), and its size
is referred to as the in-degree (respectively, out-degree) of u. In the IC model, each
newly activated node u′ tries to activate each inactive out-neighbor u ∈ n+(u′) once
with probability p((u′, u)), which is modeled as a weight of the edge (u′, u) in G
and is typically set to 1|n−(u)| [24]. If multiple nodes have the same out-neighbor,
they all try to activate it in an arbitrary order independently. The diffusion process
starts from a set S of nodes (seeds), which are active at time 0. Each seed tries
to activate its out-neighbors at time 0, each activated out-neighbor stays active and
tries to activate its own inactive out-neighbors at time 1, and the process proceeds
similarly and ends when no new node becomes active. A seed-set S activates a
node u with probability PS(u), and the spread of S over V , N , and V is defined as
σ(S) =
∑
u∈V PS(u), σN (S) =
∑
u∈N PS(u), and σV (S) =
∑
u∈V PS(u), respectively.
For any seed-set S, σN (S) and σV (S) are monotone submodular functions [10]. We
may omit the argument and value of σN and σV when it is clear from the context
(e.g., write a seed-set with zero σN instead of a seed-set S with σN (S) = 0).
3 Measures and Problem Definition
To study influence maximization in our setting, we need a measure that quantifies
the quality of a seed-set and can be incorporated into methods to construct a high
quality seed-set. The measure should favor a seed-set S that influences many non-
vulnerable but few vulnerable nodes and also satisfy the following properties:
1. It should consider the influence of vulnerable and non-vulnerable nodes. In fact,
we observed experimentally that constructing S based on only σN (S) (resp.,
σV(S)) results in large σV(S) (resp., small σN (S)), which is undesirable.
2. It should consider what fraction of all influenced users are vulnerable. This is
important to penalize seed-sets that influence a large expected number of users
many of whom are vulnerable.
3. It should allow constructing a seed-set with guaranteed quality (e.g., not “too far”
from the optimal seed-set in the worst case) [10].
Natural Measures. A first measure is the difference σN (S) − σV (S) given a seed-
set S (i.e., the measure used in [20], with vulnerable nodes being treated as non-
target nodes). This measure does not consider what fraction of all influenced users
are vulnerable. Therefore, it may lead to constructing seed-sets with a large ex-
pected number of influenced users many of whom are vulnerable. For example, this
measure would favor promoting an alcoholic beverage to 140 users out of whom
40 have drinking problems, instead of 59 users with no drinking problems, since
(140 − 40) − 40 > 59 − 0. In addition, σN (S) − σV (S) cannot be approximately max-
imized [9]. Thus, to construct a seed-set S, one has to settle with heuristics, such
as [20], which offer no approximation guarantees.
Another natural measure is the ratio σN (S)σV(S) . The ratio considers what fraction
of all influenced users are vulnerable, because it can be rewritten as σ(S)−σV (S)
σV (S)
=
σ(S)
σV (S)
− 1 and the constant can be removed when it is maximized. However, it is
undefined for every seed-set S with σV (S) = 0 (i.e., S that does not influence vul-
nerable nodes). Thus, it cannot distinguish between any two seed-sets S1, S2 such
that σV (S1) = σV (S2) = 0 and σN (S1) > σN (S2) (e.g., it cannot favor promoting
an alcoholic beverage to 59 users with no drinking problems vs. 2 users with no
drinking problems) and also it is not clear how it can be approximately maximized.
For example, the GreedRatio framework [3] for maximizing a ratio of two monotone
submodular functions would result in a seed-set of unbounded size, which is not use-
ful for influence maximization. The inverse ratio σV(S)σN (S) is defined for σV (S) = 0 but
it cannot be used to distinguish between the seed-sets S1 and S2 above, and it is
equally difficult to minimize (minimizing it is equivalent to maximizing σN (S)
σV (S)
).
Thus, it cannot be used to find a seed-set with small or zero σV (S) and large σN (S),
which helps our goal (to attract many users few of whom are vulnerable).
Our Proposed Measure. To retain the benefits of the ratio σN (S)σV(S) , while fixing
the issues caused by seed-sets that do not influence any vulnerable nodes, we apply
additive smoothing [16] to the ratio. This leads to our additive smoothing ratio (ASR)
measure, defined as ASR(S, c) = σN (S)+cσV(S)+c , where S is a seed-set and c > 0 is a
constant determined by the organization performing influence maximization. ASR is
well defined (and larger than zero) when σV (S) = 0. Furthermore, among the seed-
sets S1 and S2 mentioned above, it favors the seed-set S1, which influences a larger
expected number of non-vulnerable nodes. In ASR, the constant c can be seen as a
weight whose addition to σN (S) and to σV(S) changes their ratio and determines
seed selection. The impact of c on seed selection will be discussed in Sections 4 and
6. Given our measure ASR, we define our influence maximization problem below.
u1 u4
v1
v2
v3
u2
u3
1
1
1
1
1
1
(a)
Seed-set S σN (S) σV(S) ASR(S, 1)
S0 = {u2, u4} 2 1 3/2
S0 ∪ {u1} 3 2 4/3
S1 = {u2, u3, u4} 3 2 4/3
S1 ∪ {u1} 4 3 5/4
S2 = {u3} 1 2 2/3
S2 ∪ {u2} 2 2 1
S3 = {u1, u3} 3 3 1
S3 ∪ {u2} 4 3 5/4
(b)
Fig. 1: (a) Example graph. N = {u1, . . . , u4}, V =
{v1, v2, v3}, and each edge probability is equal to 1. (b) The
spread over non-vulnerable nodes, the spread over vulnera-
ble nodes, and ASR for different seeds-sets with c = 1.
Problem Definition. Given a
graph G whose nodes are par-
titioned into N and V and pa-
rameters k and c, find a seed-
set S ⊆ N of size at most k
that maximizes ASR(S, c).
Our problem is NP-hard
(by reduction from the stan-
dard influence maximization
problem [10]) and cannot
be approximated using algo-
rithms for submodular [4, 18]
or supermodular [23] maximization. This is because ASR is non-monotone and is
neither submodular nor supermodular, as we show below.
Example 1. Consider the graph of Fig. 1a, whose set of nodes is partitioned into
N = {u1, . . . , u4} and V = {v1, v2, v3}, and the ASR of the seed-sets in Fig. 1b.
ASR(S, c) is: (I) non-monotone, because for S0 ⊆ S0 ∪ {u1}, ASR(S0, 1) = 3/2 >
ASR(S0 ∪ {u1}, 1) = 4/3; (II) not submodular, because for S0 ⊆ S1 and u1 ∈ N \ S1,
ASR(S0∪{u1}, 1)−ASR(S0, 1) = −1/6 < ASR(S1∪{u1}, 1)−ASR(S1, 1) = −1/12, and
(III) not supermodular, because for S2 ⊆ S3 and u2 ∈ N \ S3 , ASR(S2 ∪ {u2}, 1) −
ASR(S2, 1) = 1/3 > ASR(S3 ∪ {u2}, 1)−ASR(S3, 1) = 1/4. uunionsq
4 Baselines: Greedy Heuristics for Maximizing ASR
We explore two greedy baseline methods for constructing a seed-set S with size at
most k and large ASR(S, c). The first is, GR, a natural heuristic for limiting the
influence to vulnerable nodes. GR performs k iterations. In each iteration i (steps 3
to 6), it adds into the subset Si the node u with the maximum ratio between: (I) the
sum of the marginal gain in σN , caused by adding u, and the constant c, and (II) the
sum of the marginal gain in σV , caused by adding u, and the constant c. Since ASR
is non-monotone, a subset constructed in an iteration before imay have a larger ASR
than Si. Therefore, in step 7, GR considers the subsets constructed in all iterations
and returns the one with the largest ASR.
Algorithm: GR (GReedy heurisitc)
Input:N ⊆ V , V ⊆ V , graphG, parameter k,
constant c
Output: Subset S ⊆ N of size |S| ≤ k
1 i← 0 // Iteration counter
2 Si ← {}
3 while i < k do
4 u ∈ argmax
v∈N\{Si}
σN (Si|v) + c
σV(Si|v) + c
5 Si+1 ← Si ∪ {u}
6 i← i+ 1
7 return S ← argmax
S′∈{S1,...,Sk}
ASR(S
′
, c)
We now discuss how GR deals with
a non-vulnerable node v that influences
no vulnerable nodes. Adding v into Si
makes the objective function of GR
equal to σN (Si|v)+cc (see step 4), since
Si does not influence more vulnera-
ble nodes after the addition of v (i.e.,
σV (Si|v) = 0). If σN (Si|v) is small,
it is better to add a different node v′
which influences few vulnerable nodes
but “through” these vulnerable nodes reaches out to many more non-vulnerable
nodes than v. In fact, GR adds v′ instead of v if σN (Si|v
′)+c
σV (Si|v′)+c >
σN (Si|v)+c
c
, and
uses the parameter c to control the bias towards nodes such as v′, which influence a
small number of vulnerable nodes but many more non-vulnerable nodes than u, as
shown in Example 2 and experimentally in Section 6.
Example 2. In iteration i = 0, the non-vulnerable nodes u1 to u4 in Table 1a are
considered and the node u ∈ {u1, . . . , u4} with the largest σN (S0|u)+cσV(S0|u)+c is added into
S0 = {}. As shown in Table 1b, c determines the added node. For c = 0.01, u1 that
influences no vulnerable and few non-vulnerable nodes is added, for c = 1, u3 that
influences one vulnerable and many non-vulnerable nodes is added, and for c = 10,
u4 that influences more vulnerable and non-vulnerable nodes than u2 is added. uunionsq
Node u1 u2 u3 u4
σV 0 0.01 1 10
σN 3 5 150 300
(a)
c 0.01 0.02 1 10
Added
Node u1 u2 u3 u4
(b)
Table 1: (a) Non-vulnerable nodes u that are considered for
addition into S0 = {}, and the expected number of vulner-
able and non-vulnerable nodes they influence. (b) The node
that is added into S0 for different values of c.
To improve the efficiency
of GR, we propose a variant,
GRMB (MB is for MIA Batch-
update). Unlike GR which
computes spread exactly by
adapting the method of [8] to
the IC model, GRMB estimates
the spread efficiently using the MIA (Maximum Influence Arborescence) method
[24]. MIA estimates the probability PS(u) for a node u and seed-set S based on the
union of paths from S that have the highest probability to influence u, instead of all
paths. Consequently, GRMB is two orders of magnitude faster on average than GR.
5 The ISS Approximation Algorithm for Maximizing ASR
This section presents ISS (Iterative Subsample with Spread bounds), starting from
the bound functions of ASR that ISS employs.
Lower and upper bound function of ASR. ASR(S, c) is non-monotone non-
submodular for any subset S (see Section 3) and, thus, it is difficult to approxi-
mate directly. Our ISS algorithm finds a seed-set S with approximately maximum
ASR(S, c), using two submodular functions ASRL and ASRU that bound ASR
from below and from above, respectively. These functions are defined as follows:
ASRL(S, c, Y ) =
σN (S) + c
σ̂V,Y (S) + c
=
σN (S) + c
σV(Y ) +
∑
u∈S\Y
σV({u}) +
∑
u∈Y \S
(σV(Y )− σV(Y \ {u})) + c
ASRU(S, c, piY ) =
σN (S) + c
̂
σV,piY (S) + c
=
σN (S) + c∑
u∈S
(σV,Y,piY (u)) + c
where Y ⊆ N is the parameter in each bound function, and
σV,Y,piY (u) =
{
σV(piYu )− σV(piYu−) , if u ∈ Y
0 , otherwise
ASRL is obtained by replacing σV(S) in ASR with its modular upper bound
σ̂V,Y (S) (see Eq. 1) and using the fact that σV({}) = 0. ASRU is obtained by
replacing σV(S) in ASR with its modular lower bound
̂
σV,piY (S) (see Eq. 2).
ASRL, as well as ASRU, is submodular with respect to a seed-set S, because:
(a) Its numerator is monotone submodular, as a sum of the monotone submodular
function σN (S) and the constant c [12], (b) its denominator is a modular function,
as a sum of a modular bound function and the constant c, and (c) the ratio between a
submodular function and a modular function is clearly submodular (see Section 2).
However, ASRL, as well as ASRU, is non-monotone, as shown in Example 3.
Example 3. (continuing from Example 1) Let c = 1 and S′ = {}. SinceASRL(S1, 1, S′)
= 4/4 > ASRL(S1∪{u1}, 1, S′) = 5/6, ASRL is non-monotone. Let S′′ = {u2, u3} and
its permutation piS′′ = (u3, u2). SinceASRU(S3, 1, piS
′′
) = 4/3 > ASRU(S3∪{u2}, 1, piS′′ )
= 5/4, ASRU is non-monotone.
ISS algorithm. The algorithm works iteratively, as can be seen from the pseu-
docode. In each iteration, it creates a seed-set Scur in three phases: (a) dummy
element creation, (b) construction of three candidate seed-sets (one using ASR, a
second using ASRL and a third using ASRU), and (c) selection of the best can-
didate seed-set and removal of dummy elements from it. The iterations stop when
Scur is not better than the previously created seed-set Spr in terms of ASR (steps
21-22). This guarantees that the algorithm terminates [9].
Algorithm: ISS (Iterative Subsample with Spread bounds)
Input: Set of non-vulnerable nodesN ⊆ V , set of vulnerable nodes V ⊆ V , graphG, parameter k, constant c
Output: Subset S ⊆ N of size |S| ≤ k
1 Spr ← {}
2 Scur ← N
3 while true do
// Phase I
4 D ← set of k dummy elements {u1, . . . , uk} such that, for each element ui, i ∈ [1, k], and every set
S ⊆ N : σN (S ∪ {ui}) = σN (S) and σV(S ∪ {ui}) = σV(S)
5 N ′ ← N
6 while |N
′|
k is not an integer do
7 Add intoN ′ a dummy element u′ /∈ D such that σN (S ∪ {u′}) = σN (S) and
σV(S ∪ {u′}) = σV(S)
// Phase II
8 i← 0; SO0 ← {}; SL0 ← {}; SU0 ← {}
9 while i < k do
10 R ← uniform random sample ofN ′ with |N′|k elements
11 Add intoR a random element fromD
12 uO ∈ argmaxu∈R(ASR(SOi ∪ {u}, c)− ASR(SOi , c))
13 SOi+1 ← SOi ∪ {uO}
14 uL ∈ argmaxu∈R(ASRL(SLi ∪ {u}, c, Spr)− ASRL(SLi , c, Spr))
15 SLi+1 ← SLi ∪ {uL}
16 uU ∈ argmaxu∈R(ASRU(SUi ∪ {u}, c, piSpr )− ASRU(SUi , c, piSpr ))
17 SUi+1 ← SUi ∪ {uU}
18 i← i+ 1
// Phase III
19 Scur ← argmaxS∈{SO
k
,SL
k
,SU
k
} ASR(S, c)
20 Scur ← Remove all dummy elements from Scur
21 ifASR(Scur, c) ≤ ASR(Spr, c) then
22 break
23 Spr ← Scur
24 return Scur
Phase I (steps 4 to 7): A setD of k dummy elements whose addition into any seed-set
S does not change σN (S) and σV(S), are created. Then, a dummy element u′ /∈ D
is added into a subset N ′ (initially containing all non-vulnerable nodes), until |N ′|k
is an integer.
Phase II (steps 8 to 18): A random sample of |N
′|
k elements from N ′ and a dummy
element is created. Next, the candidate subset SOi , S
U
i and S
L
i is extended with a
node in the sample causing the largest marginal gain with respect to ASR, ASRL,
and ASRU, respectively. The parameter of ASRL is the seed-set Spr, constructed
in the previous iteration and that of ASRU is a random permutation piSpr of Spr.
Phase III (steps 19 to 23): The best candidate subset with respect to ASR is selected
as Scur, and all dummy elements are removed from it. If Scur is not better than
Spr in terms of ASR, the while loop in step 3 is terminated and Scur is returned.
Otherwise, another iteration is performed with the aim of generating a seed-set with
larger ASR, due to the use of different (and often better [9]) bounds.
Theorem 1. ISS constructs a seed-set S such that:
E[ASR(S, c)] ≥max
(
σV(S∗) + c
σ̂V,Spr (S∗) + c
,
c
c+ k ·maxu∈N σ̂V,Spr ({u})
)
· 1
e
· (1− 1
e
) ·ASR(S∗, c)
where S∗ = argmaxS⊆N ,|S|≤k ASR(S, c), σ̂V,Spr is the modular upper bound used
in ASRL (step 14) in the last iteration of ISS, and the expectation is over every
possible S constructed by ISS.
Proof. Let SL,jk (respectively, Sprj ) denote the subset S
L
k (respectively, Spr) in
step 19 of an iteration j of ISS (j-th execution of the while loop in step 3). Since
ASRL bounds ASR from below, we have ASR(SL,jk , c) ≥ ASRL(SL,jk , c, Sprj ). Also,
from the monotonicity of expectation, this inequality can be written as
E[ASR(SL,jk , c)] ≥ E[ASRL(SL,jk , c, Sprj )], (4)
where each expectation is over every SL,jk . We now observe that
E[ASRL(SL,jk , c, Sprj )] ≥
1
e
· (1− 1
e
) · ASRL(S∗,j , c, Sprj ), (5)
where S∗,j = argmaxS⊆N ,|S|≤k ASRL(S, c, Sprj ). Eq. 5 holds because S
L,j
k is con-
structed based on the Sub-sample Greedy algorithm [17] with ASRL in each itera-
tion (execution of the while loop in step 3) of ISS. Thus, we obtain:
E[ASR(SL,jk , c)] ≥
1
e
· (1− 1
e
) ·ASRL(S∗,j , c, Sprj )
≥1
e
· (1− 1
e
) · σN (S
∗,j) + c
σ̂V,Sprj (S
∗,j) + c
·
[
σN (S∗,j) + c
σV(S∗,j) + c
· σV(S
∗,j) + c
σN (S∗,j) + c
]
≥ σV(S
∗,j) + c
σ̂V,Sprj (S
∗,j) + c
· 1
e
· (1− 1
e
) ·ASR(S∗,j , c).
The first inequality holds from Eqs. 4 and 5, the second from the definition of
ASRL and because we multiply by 1 (in square brackets), and the third by the
definition of ASR. Since the third inequality holds for every iteration j of ISS:
E[ASR(SL, c)] ≥ σV(S
∗) + c
σ̂V,Spr (S∗) + c
· 1
e
· (1− 1
e
) · ASR(S∗, c), (6)
where SL is the subset SL,jk constructed in step 19 of the last iteration of ISS.
Let SU,jk (respectively, Sprj ) denote the subset S
U
k (respectively, Spr) in step 19
of an iteration j of ISS (j-th execution of the while loop in step 3). We first prove:
̂σV,Sprj (S
U,j
k ) ≤
∑
u∈SU,j
k
̂σV,Sprj ({u}) ≤ k · max
u∈SU,j
k
̂σV,Sprj ({u}) ≤ k · maxu∈N ̂σV,Sprj ({u}) (7)
The first inequality holds because ̂σV,Sprj is submodular, the second because
|SU,jk | ≤ k and ̂σV,Sprj is non-negative, and the third because S
U,j
k ⊆ N . From
Eq. 7 and σV (SU,jk ) ≤ ̂σV,Sprj (S
U,j
k ) (as ̂σV,Sprj bounds σV from above), we get:
σV (S
U,j
k ) + c ≤ c+ k ·maxu∈N ̂σV,Sprj ({u}), which implies:
̂
σ
V,piSprj
(SU,jk ) + c
σV(S
U,j
k ) + c
≥
̂
σ
V,piSprj
(SU,jk ) + c
c+ k ·maxu∈N ̂σV,Sprj ({u})
≥ c
c+ k ·maxu∈N ̂σV,Sprj ({u})
. (8)
The second inequality is because
̂
σV,piSprj (S
U,j
k ) ≥ 0 by definition. ASR(SU,jk , c) =
σN (S
U,j
k
)+c
σV (S
U,j
k
)+c
·
̂
σ
V,piSprj
(S
U,j
k
)+c
̂
σ
V,piSprj
(S
U,j
k
)+c
=
σN (S
U,j
k
)+c
̂
σ
V,piSprj
(S
U,j
k
)+c
·
̂
σ
V,piSprj
(S
U,j
k
)+c
σV (S
U,j
k
)+c
, which implies:
E[ASR(SU,jk , c)] =E[
σN (S
U,j
k ) + ĉ
σV,piSprj (S
U,j
k ) + c
·
̂
σV,piSprj (S
U,j
k ) + c
σV(S
U,j
k ) + c
]
≥E[ σN (S
U,j
k ) + ĉ
σV,piSprj (S
U,j
k ) + c
· c
c+ k ·maxu∈N σ̂V,Sprj ({u})
]
from Eq. 8, where the expectation is over each SU,jk . Also, λj =
c
c+k·maxu∈N ̂σV,Sprj ({u})
is constant in iteration j, so
E[ASR(SU,jk , c)] ≥λj · E[
σN (S
U,j
k ) + ĉ
σV,piSprj (S
U,j
k ) + c
] = λj · E[ASRU(SU,jk , c, piSprj )]. (9)
We now observe that
E[ASRU(SU,jk , c, pi
Sprj )] ≥ 1
e
· (1− 1
e
) · ASRU(S∗,j , c, piSprj ), (10)
where S∗,j = argmaxS⊆N ,|S|≤k ASRU(S, c, pi
Sprj ). Eq. 10 holds because SU,jk is
constructed based on the Sub-sample Greedy algorithm [17] with ASRU in each
iteration (execution of the while loop in step 3) of ISS. Thus, we obtain:
E[ASR(SU,jk , c)] ≥λj ·
1
e
· (1− 1
e
) ·ASRU(S∗,j , c, piSprj )
≥λj · 1
e
· (1− 1
e
) · σN (S
∗,j) + c
̂
σV,piSprj (S
∗,j) + c
· [
̂
σV,piSprj (S
∗,j) + c
σV(S∗,j) + c
]
≥ c
c+ k ·maxu∈N σ̂V,Sprj ({u})
· 1
e
· (1− 1
e
) ·ASR(S∗,j , c)
The first inequality holds from Eqs. 9 and 10, the second because the term in
square brackets is at most 1 (since
̂
σV,piSprj bounds σV from below), and the third
from the definition of λj and ASR. Since the third inequality holds for each iteration
j of ISS, we obtain:
E[ASR(SU, c)] ≥ c
c+ k ·maxu∈N σ̂V,Spr ({u})
· 1
e
· (1− 1
e
) · ASR(S∗, c) (11)
where SU is the subset SU,jk constructed in step 19 of the last iteration of ISS. The
proof follows from Eqs. 6 and 11 and step 19 in ISS. uunionsq
Although the guarantee in Theorem 1 holds irrespectively of the number of itera-
tions of ISS, we observed, in our experiments, that more iterations result in seed-sets
with larger ASR. This is because the parameter Spr and piSpr of the bound functions
ASRL and ASRU, respectively, is updated in every iteration which often improves
the bounds [9]. We also observed that ISS needed at most 4 iterations to terminate.
ISS is faster than GR and scales better with respect to k, because it selects seeds
from a sample of N of size approximately |N |k , instead of the entire set N , and
because it performs a small number of iterations.
6 Experimental Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate GR, GRMB , and ISS, in terms of effectiveness and effi-
ciency, by comparing them against TIM [20], a heuristic for finding a seed-set S with
size at most k and large σN (S)− σV (S), and two baselines that employ Greedy [18]:
RB, which applies Greedy [18] to the subset of non-vulnerable nodes that do not
influence vulnerable nodes, and RB′, which applies Greedy with the objective func-
tion σN . RB creates a seed-set S with σV(S) = 0 and was used to see whether S can
have large σN (S). RB′ creates a seed-set S with large σN (S) and was used to see
whether S can have small σV(S). RB′ found seed-sets that influenced many more
vulnerable nodes than those of all other methods, thus, we omit its results.
Dataset # of nodes # of edges avg in-degree max in-degree # of vuln. nodes θ
(|V |) (|E|) (|V|)
WI 7115 103689 13.7 452 100 0.01
TW 235 2479 10.5 52 25 0.01
POL 1490 19090 11.9 305 100 0.003
AB 840 10008 11.9 137 10 0.01
Table 2: Characteristics of datasets.
All algorithms were im-
plemented in C++ and
applied to the Wiki-vote
(WI), Twitter (TW), and
PolBlogs (POL) datasets (see Table 2). POL is available at http://www-
personal.umich.edu/ mejn/ and all other datasets at http://snap.stanford.edu/data. We also
used synthetic datasets, generated by the Albert-Barabasi model, as in [15], with a
varying number of edges in [500, 10000]. We refer to the dataset with 10000 edges
as AB. We set p(u′, u) = 1|n−(u)| for each edge (u
′, u) as in [5, 15]. We also set the
maximum probability threshold for a path to θ = 0.01, so that all methods achieve
a good accuracy/efficiency trade-off by discarding paths that have low probability
to influence a node, as in [6]. The default value for k was 5 and for c was 1. The
vulnerable nodes were selected randomly. To improve the efficiency of ISS, we used
the CELF optimization [10] for the submodular bound functions (steps 14 and 16).
Also, the results for ISS were averaged over 10 runs. All experiments ran on an In-
tel Xeon CPU E5-2640 @2.66GHz with 64GB RAM. Due to space limitations, we
omit some results that were qualitatively similar to the reported ones (e.g., results
for varying |V| in WI).
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Fig. 2: Spread of vulnerable and non-vulnerable nodes: (a) POL vs c, (b) TW vs c, (c) POL vs
k, and (d) TW vs k.
Comparison to RB. GR constructs seed-sets that influence at least 5.5 and up to 38
times more non-vulnerable nodes than those constructed by RB, for different values
of c (see Figs. 2a and 2b) and k (see Figs. 2c and 2d). The reason is that, for all c
and k values, vulnerable nodes were distributed across the graph. So, the seed-sets
constructed by RB that did not influence vulnerable nodes did not influence many
non-vulnerable nodes, while those constructed by GR influenced a small number of
vulnerable nodes but could reach to and influence many more non-vulnerable nodes.
Moreover, TIM, GRMB , and ISS outperformed RB (the results for them are omit-
ted). Thus, in all subsequent experiments, we omit results for RB, since it does not
construct practically useful solutions and set c = 1 because this allows constructing
seed-sets with good σN /σV trade-off.
ASR with c = 1. All our algorithms substantially outperform TIM in terms of ASR
for varying k (see Figs. 3a, 3b, and 3c) and varying number of vulnerable nodes |V|
(see Fig. 3d). ISS outperformed all other methods, being 3, 1.7, and 2 times better
than TIM, GR, and GRMB on average (over all datasets and k values), respectively.
ISS was also 8.9, 3.3, and 1.9 times better than TIM, GR, and GRMB on average
(over all |V| values in Fig. 3d), respectively. We omit the results for GR and TIM for
the largest dataset WI from all subsequent experiments, since GR and TIM did not
finish within 3 days.
Spread of Vulnerable and Non-vulnerable Nodes. We demonstrate that all
our algorithms substantially outperform TIM in terms of σN and/or σV . First,
we report Figs. 4a and 4b, where each point (x, y) corresponds to the values
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Fig. 5: Spread of non-vulnerable nodes vs k for (a) TW , and (b) WI. Spread of vulnerable nodes
vs k for (c) POL. Spread of vulnerable nodes for (d) TW , and (e) WI.
(1 − σV (S)|V| , σN (S)|N | ), referred to as protection and utility of a seed-set S. ISS out-
performed TIM with respect to both protection and utility, achieving overall better
protection than GR and better utility than GRMB . We also report σN and σV in
Figs. 4c to 5d. GR and TIM constructed seed-sets that influence too many vulnera-
ble nodes. GRMB performed inconsistently (e.g., its seed-sets influenced few vul-
nerable nodes in Fig. 5b and too many vulnerable nodes in Fig. 5c). ISS influenced
few vulnerable nodes and a moderate number of non-vulnerable nodes, achieving a
good σN /σV trade-off.
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Fig. 6: Runtime vs k for (a) POL, and (b) TW . Runtime vs (c) number of vulnerable nodes for
POL, and (d) number of edges for AB.
Efficiency. All our methods are much faster than TIM for varying k (see Figs. 6a
and 6b). TIM required 10 hours when k = 50 in the case of TW which only has
235 nodes, and 17 days when k = 25 in the case of POL. GR was faster but did
not terminate within 3 days in the case of WI , and GRMB was the fastest due to
its efficient spread estimation function [24]. ISS was significantly faster than GR
and TIM and the most scalable method with respect to k. Fig. 6c shows the runtime
for varying |V|. All our algorithms become faster with |V|, since fewer nodes can
be selected as seeds and are at least three orders of magnitude faster than TIM on
average. Fig. 6d shows the runtime for varying number of edges. Our algorithms
were faster than TIM by up to three orders of magnitude.
7 Related work
No existing work addresses influence maximization when there are vulnerable
nodes. The most related works are [20] and [15]. [20] aims to maximize the differ-
ence between the expected number of influenced users who belong to a target group
and the expected number of all other influenced users. Our work differs from [20]
along three dimensions. First, [20] can select target nodes as seeds, but we cannot do
the same for vulnerable nodes, as this would harm them. Second, our ASR measure
has desired properties unlike the measure σN (S) − σV(S) in [20] (see Section 3).
Third, our methods are substantially more effective and efficient than the heuristic
in [20]. [15] is applied after influence maximization (i.e., considers a given seed-set)
and seeks to delete edges in order to limit the activation probability of vulnerable
nodes in the Linear Threshold model [10]. Thus, it is orthogonal to our work.
There are many works on targeted viral marketing (e.g., [11, 13, 20, 22, 25]). For
example, [13] considered influence maximization when each target node has a con-
stant profit, and [22] considered the impact of the location and login time of target
nodes. Unlike ours, the works in [11,13,20,22,25] do not consider vulnerable nodes.
There are also works on influence maximization considering nodes with negative
impact on the influence diffusion process [2, 5]. [5] studied influence maximization
under a model where each node can diffuse information of opposite content to the
information that is being spread from the seed-set. [2] studied influence maximiza-
tion, when some nodes reject the diffused information. Different from these works,
no node negatively impacts the influence diffusion process in our approach.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we study influence maximization when there are vulnerable nodes. We
first propose a measure for limiting the influence to vulnerable nodes, which is ob-
tained by applying additive smoothing to the ratio between the expected number of
influenced non-vulnerable nodes and the expected number of influenced vulnerable
nodes. Based on the measure, we define a new influence maximization problem that
seeks to find a seed-set of size at most k that maximizes the measure. We propose
two greedy baseline heuristics, and the ISS approximation algorithm to solve our
influence maximization problem. We evaluate our methods on synthetic and real-
world datasets and show that ISS outperforms the method of [20] and our baselines
in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.
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